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THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL POWER: SOME
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY DECISION
STEPHEN L. CARTERI
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a society that chooses with increasing frequency to
leave its most difficult questions for judicial resolution. Until recently,
however, the problem of how to punish a miscreant who happens to
reside in the White House had never been tossed into the courts. When
the President went wrong, the political system dealt with him.
Presidents have gone wrong frequently. Presidents have been ac-
cused of misconduct in office for about as long as there have been Presi-
dents.1 If the more recent Chief Executives sometimes seem to have
been especially fond of abusing their powers,2 that may only be because
historians, viewing the distant past through the glass of folklore, have
been kind.
Rarely have formal punishments for presidential misconduct been
meted out. Only one President has been impeached. None has ever
been convicted. The process, moreover, has been decidedly political:
The three Presidents who came closest to being formally removed from
office-John Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and Richard Nixon-were ex-
traordinarily unpopular by the time Congress began to act against
them. In general, presidential abuse of authority has been punished, if
at all, through legislative actions short of impeachment, through failure
of reelection, or through trashing of the President's historical image.
The federal courts have played only a limited role in keeping Presi-
dents within the bounds of the law. When they have reviewed presiden-
tial actions, they have almost always done so indirectly through the fic-
tion of a suit against the official charged with implementing the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1976, Stanford University;
J.D. 1979, Yale University.
I am grateful to Enola Aird, Guido Calabresi, Robert Cover, Martha Minow,
Peter Schuck, and Harry Wellington for their thoughtful and generous criticism on
earlier versions of this essay. I have also benefitted from the efforts of Dean Hashimoto
and Gerard Nolan, who referred me to a number of useful sources.
' See generally RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENTS TO CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT
(C. Woodward ed. 1974).
2 See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Bernstein, The
Road to Watergate and Beyond. The Growth and Abuse of Executive Authority Since
1940, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 58.
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disputed policy.' Until just a few years ago, courts routinely dismissed
actions naming the President as a defendant.4 The courts willingly sent
signals to the other branches on the constitutionality of presidential
acts, but they refused to proceed against the President directly.
So matters stood when, in the summer of 1974, a unanimous Su-
preme Court ruled in United States v. Nixon that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, the President was a proper subject for judicial process.5
The Court found judicial process appropriate where the President had
custody of tape recordings subpoenaed for use in a criminal case. By
refusing to quash the subpoena, the Justices raised a fresh question,
one that prior practice had avoided: What if the President refuses to
comply? That question became moot; he did comply, leaving legal
scholars to speculate on whether the federal courts could have held him
in contempt if he had not.
This Article speculates that the contempt issue should be viewed
as part of a larger question: Who has the authority to punish the Presi-
dent when he violates his oath? Punishment of the President, the Arti-
cle suggests, is in essence a political task. The Article takes as its point
of departure Nixon v. Fitzgerald,8 decided by the Court early in the
summer of 1982. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the presidential immunity
decision of this Article's title, a sharply divided Court ruled that an
individual's suit for damages was not a circumstance in which subject-
ing the President to judicial process was appropriate.7 The message of
that case may well be that had the President not turned over the tapes
at issue in United States v. Nixon, the federal courts could have done
3 Through the years, many a landmark decision has been rendered in this man-
ner. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (suit against Secre-
tary of State); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The
Steel Seizure Case) (suit against Secretary of Commerce); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981) (The Iranian Assets Case) (suit against Secretary of Treasury).
Before the Court's 1952 decision in Youngstown, presidential actions challenged in fed-
eral court through this subterfuge were invariably sustained. See Kauper, The Steel
Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141,
144-51 (1952).
" See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Livingston v.
Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
5 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974).
6 457 U.S. 731 (1982). This point is as good as any for a confession and a dis-
claimer. The author first became interested in these issues while serving as a law clerk
to Justice Marshall during the Term in which the first presidential immunity case,
Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), came before the Court. The judgment in
that case was affirmed by an equally divided Court. The author had no part in any
deliberations concerning the second presidential immunity case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
which provides the springboard for analysis in this essay. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, was
briefed, argued, and decided after the author completed his clerkship.
" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 748.
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nothing at all: the constitutional analysis in Nixon v. Fitzgerald leads
almost ineluctably to the proposition that the judicial power of the
United States does not include the authority to punish the President of
the United States.
That conclusion is not indefensible, but in a society premised on
the rule of law, it ought to be controversial. Early commentary on
Nixon v. Fitzgerald focused on whether the case was rightly decided, 8
rather than on the implications of the decision. Those implications,
however, have both practical and theoretical significance, not because
they spell doom for the republic,9 but because the reasoning and the
result in the presidential immunity decision reflect a particular view of
the judicial role in the system of checks and balances.
This view of the judiciary's role rests on something that those
trained in the law do not always like to admit: the Constitution
prescribes a system of government as well as of law, a political system
as well as a legal one. The courts do not do everything that is necessary
to govern the country, and when they act within the system of checks
and balances, they are playing a political role. This system is dynamic
and usually operates without judicially-enforceable rules. When the
branches conflict, the winner will be not the one that cites the most
cases but the one that can muster the most political support.
Judicial power to reach misconduct within the other branches of
government thus has a political aspect. The power is exercised within a
system of checks and balances, and the creation of any new remedy
against one of the branches of government must affect the entire system.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald suggests a judicial reluctance to create new reme-
dies against the executive branch-even where needful to right a
wrong-except in instances of the most compelling necessity. Demon-
strating that the Fitzgerald result derives from the dual political and
legal nature of the system requires that the Court's reasoning be re-
8 See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 62, 226-36
(1982) (Nixon v. Fitzgerald result is departure from precedent); Flanz, The Constitu-
tion Does Not Grant Presidential Immunity, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1982, at E 14, col. 4
(letter to the editor) (no constitutional basis for the decision).
' After all, the United States has had Presidents for nearly two hundred years and
none has ever been sued successfully for damages. That potential civil liability has been
an important factor in presidential decisionmaking over the past two centuries is diffi-
cult to believe and impossible to prove. Moreover, the decisions that ultimately are the
most important in the nation's history-whether to go to war, whom to nominate to the
Supreme Court, how to structure a new regulatory initiative-would fall outside the
reach of anyone's proposal for civil liability. Even Justice White's Nixon v. Fitzgerald
dissent, which was joined by three other Justices, would apparently have granted abso-
lute immunity for the performance of "a constitutionally assigned executive function,
the performance of which would be substantially impaired by the possibility of a pri-
vate action for damages." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 785.
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viewed in some detail, dissected, and then reassembled in slightly differ-
ent form. This analysis will make possible a consideration of what the
case really says about the judicial role in checking and balancing the
other branches of the federal government and what it implies for the
relationship of the other two branches with one another.
II. DISSECTING THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY DECISION
A. What the Court Said
To understand what really happened in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it is
important to recall the context in which it arose. The plaintiff, a dis-
charged civil servant, sued for damages based on causes of action that
he claimed were properly to be implied from federal law and from the
Constitution.1" These implied causes of action were the ones that the
Supreme Court refused to recognize in a suit against the President of
the United States even though the Court had recognized similar causes
of action with respect to persons other than the President. That the
rejected causes of action were "implied" matters because implied rights
of action make little sense as anything except common law, which is to
say law created by judges."' Although the Supreme Court has tried
various other explanations for what federal courts do when they imply
a right to sue, 2 a statute or clause not expressly providing a right to
sue cannot reasonably be said to "create" one. Even if implying a pri-
vate right of action is viewed as an exercise in statutory construction, it
1 The trial court held that Fitzgerald had stated causes of action under the first
amendment, under 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979) (which grants executive employ-
ees the right to give congressional testimony), and under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Supp. III
1979) (which makes obstruction of congressional testimony a crime). 457 U.S. at 740-
41 & n.20. The majority stated that the implication issue was not before the Court, id.,
but as the text makes clear, that is arguably the very question the Court decided.
n See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-800 (2d ed.
1973); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975); Note, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of
Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 355
(1980).
"2 For instance, at one time the Court explained that, in implying a right to sue, it
was applying the common-law statutory tort doctrine. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). In the mid-1960's, the Court explained that it was merely
applying those remedies "necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). More recently, the Court has promul-
gated a four-part "test" for implying private rights to sue. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975). In the last several Terms, some of the Justices have suggested that the
only proper question is whether Congress, at the time it enacted the legislation in ques-
tion, actually "intended" to permit private suits. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 718-30 (White, J.,
joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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is the judge who performs the delicate surgery necessary to graft a right
to sue onto a substantive provision.13
Thus one point about Nixon v. Fitzgerald is immediately appar-
ent: a decision for the plaintiff would have constituted the judicial crea-
tion of a particular type of remedy for presidential misconduct. The
Court would not have been the umpire, but one of the players. 4 Judi-
cial activity of this sort is not by itself a bad thing; courts, after all, sit
to create remedies as much as they sit to do anything else. 5 If, how-
ever, a decision for Fitzgerald would have meant judicial imposition of
a new remedy-one not mentioned in the Constitution-against the
President, then the extent of judicial power to do so must be considered.
Before this issue may be discussed in any detail, a second point
must be made. The majority opinion in the presidential immunity case
may be read in two ways: either as a common law decision or as a
constitutional decision. Nixon v. Fitzgerald clearly need not be viewed
as a definitive constitutional holding. After all, if an implied right of
action is a common law remedy, then the same court that has the power
to create the remedy if it is a good idea, has the power to limit its scope.
A decision to limit a common law remedy would make a statement
about prudence, not about power. If Nixon v. Fitzgerald states a con-
stitutional rule, then future Presidents will be immune from suit. If, on
the other hand, the majority merely stayed its hand because to do other-
wise at the time would have been imprudent, then the next case might
easily be decided differently.
Nowhere does the majority actually state that its decision confers a
constitutional immunity, although the opinion includes dicta that may
be read to so indicate. The opinion is, however, full of references to
1, The Court's rhetoric has often treated the process as one of statutory construc-
tion, but the conclusion that implied rights of action amount to judge-made law is not
so easily avoided. For precisely this reason at least one Justice has recently expressed
reservations about the entire implication question, suggesting that the creation of a
right to sue is a legislative responsibility and that by creating the right themselves, the
Justices may be violating the doctrine of separation of powers. See Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). But see Greene,
Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Separation of
Power Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469 (1980) (separation of powers doctrine presents no
bar to implication of remedies).
14 This distinction between the roles that the Court plays in different kinds of
constitutional adjudication is discussed in somewhat greater detail infra text accompa-
nying notes 107-23.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 131-33.
18 See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 747 (immunity decisions "have been
guided by the Constitution") (emphasis added); id. at 748 ("implicit in the nature of
the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers"); id. at 749 (immunity is "rooted in
the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers") (emphasis added). The opin-
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what constitutes proper public policy. At the outset the Court an-
nounces that its inquiry will necessarily involve "the kind of 'public
policy' analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court." ' Later
the majority explains: "Cognizance of . . .personal vulnerability fre-
quently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detri-
ment not only of the President and his office but also the Nation that
the Presidency was designed to serve."' 8 A cause of action against the
President, the Court says a few sentences later, is not "needed to serve
broad public interests."' 9 And in an ambiguous sentence at the end of
its opinion, the Court concludes that its rule of absolute immunity will
"advance compelling public ends."' The thrust of the Court's reason-
ing is simply that civil damages liability for the President is not a good
idea. The majority opinion makes repeated references to such concepts
as "the separation of powers,"2 but it is impossible to tell whether the
Court means to suggest that constitutional principles mandate the re-
sult, or simply that they help show why immunity is good policy.22
There is, of course, nothing unusual in the Court's undertaking
ion contains no express statement along the lines of: "This immunity is required by the
Constitution."
17 Id. at 748.
18 Id. at 753.
'1 Id. at 754.
20 Id. at 758. The sentence is ambiguous because a fair reading of it would also be
that Fitzgerald's claim was to a remedy "in order to advance compelling public ends."
21 See supra note 16.
22 Id. Chief Justice Burger, member of the five-person majority, made clear in his
concurring opinion that he considers presidential immunity firmly grounded in the
Constitution and the separation of powers. See 457 U.S. 731, 758-64. His opinion also
implies that other officials who have been held immune from various types of lawsuits
enjoy an immunity that is constitutional in scope. See id. at 764 ("the Court's holding
places a President on essentially the same footing with judges and other officials whose
absolute immunity we have recognized"). One cannot so easily explain the Court's de-
cisions granting immunity to prosecutors and judges in terms of a constitutionally based
immunity. Cases such as Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors),
and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judges), did not purport to do
anything but determine whether the common law tradition and the public interest cre-
ated an immunity that survived the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). Although the Court could perhaps have formulated an argument that these im-
munities are constitutionally mandated, it did not do so in those cases. In particular,
nothing in those cases suggested that Congress could not, if it so chose, abrogate the
immunity by statute. A state legislature presumably has similar power to abrogate im-
munity. If, as the Chief Justice seems to suggest, however, state judicial or
prosecutorial immunity is conferred by the Constitution, then it could not be abrogated
by legislative action. These cases should be distinguished from those involving members
of Congress, see infra note 117, which clearly found a constitutionally based immunity
from suit.
The fact that the Chief Justice felt it necessary to write the separate opinion that
he did suggests that at least one member of the majority regarded the Court's view as
less than entirely clear.
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public policy analysis on constitutional issues, and under the Constitu-
tion's more open-ended clauses, analysis of this kind is virtually the
norm.2" The legitimacy of constitutional reasoning is much enhanced,
however, when it is tied expressly to the Constitution itself.2 When the
Court's arguments are not directly tied to the Constitution, as they
were not in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the resulting policy analysis is gener-
ally open to a scathing retort: "Sez who?" If, on the other hand, the
Court merely used its inherent discretion to place limits on a cause of
action it had itself created by using common-law authority, then the
answer "Sez we" is more than adequate. The common law is what the
judges say it is. 5
Thus "presidential immunity decision" must turn out to be some-
thing of a misnomer. If the Supreme Court merely decided that it
would not extend a judicially-created remedy to the President, because
doing so would be a bad thing, then the decision takes on spectacular
unimportance. On that reading, Nixon v. Fitzgerald decided not a
point of constitutional doctrine, but a point of common law. The state-
ment the case made was then about prudence, not about power, and
Congress, should it muster the political will, can overturn that state-
ment by legislative action. The fact that the majority reserved the ques-
tion whether Congress may subject the President to civil damages lia-
bility through statute2" adds weight to the hypothesis that the case is
merely one of common law and therefore decided relatively little.
If Nixon v. Fitzgerald did not decide whether the President pos-
sesses an immunity that is constitutional in scope, then the question of
judicial power posed so ominously a few paragraphs back remains
2S See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24 For ambitious attempts to tie some of the Court's "public policy" decisions to
the Constitution, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928-30 (1973) (defending Griswold); Perry, Abortion, The
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 23 UCLA L. Rv. 689, 723-34 (1976) (defending Roe v. Wade).
'5 That is not to say that the development of common law rules should or can be
altogether unprincipled. On the contrary, appeal to principle is essential. The distinc-
tion between common law rulemaking and constitutional rulemaking generally lies in
the sources of the principles to which the appeal is made. See generally Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
28 457 U.S. at 749 n.27 ("In the present case we ... are presented only with
'implied' causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question as it
would arise if Congress expressly had created a damage action against the President of
the United States."); cf. id. at 763 n.7 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("once it is estab-
lished that the Constitution confers absolute immunity, . . . legislative action cannot
alter that result"); id. at 765-66 (White, J., dissenting) (if the Constitution creates the
immunity, Congress cannot abrogate it by statute).
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open.217 After all, if Congress can constitutionally create a civil damages
remedy against the President, then it is hard to imagine what constitu-
tional principles would prevent the federal courts from doing so as
well.28 Courts were creating remedies for official misconduct long
before there was a United States of America, 9 and nothing in the Con-
stitution appears to have stripped them of that power."0 So if Congress
is indeed free to overrule the presidential immunity decision, then per-
haps no constitutional rule was intended after all.
A judicial opinion, however, is rarely a complete explanation of
why a court has decided a case in a particular way." The Court's
statement that the congressional power issue should be left open need
not be read as an indication that in the minds of the Justices in the
majority, the issue truly is open. Peeking behind the scenes is impossi-
ble,3 2 but any number of plausible reasons for "reserving" the question
immediately spring to mind. The reservation might have been made to
hold a majority, to make the decision more palatable to the public and
to scholars, to gain a sixth or seventh vote in order that the outcome
seem more decisive, or for some other reason. The reservation might
also reflect a genuine concern on the part of one or more of the Justices
that the power of the federal courts to create new remedies against the
President may be distinguishable constitutionally from the power of
Congress to create such remedies.33
A hypothesis that the Constitution grants broader authority to
27 The Court has posed the question before, and has even implied an answer. See
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (federal court cannot issue order
against President), discussed infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
28 But see infra text accompanying 34-39. On the other hand, one can easily im-
agine principles that would prevent the state courts from assuming the constitutional
power to punish the President. State courts are often appropriate forums for the vindi-
cation of federal rights, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), but the federal courts
play a special role in the system of checks and balances, see generally THE FEDERALIST
No. 51 (J. Madison) (system of checks and balances); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78 & 81
(A. Hamilton) (special judicial role).
28 See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 30-36 (1983).
"0 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying right
to sue from constitutional protections). This should not be taken to suggest that the
power to create remedies is without limits. As will become clear, the thrust of this
Article is quite to the contrary.
a' See generally W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
22 But see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SU-
PREME COURT (1979) (historical fiction).
"a See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweep-
ing Clause," 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975) (suggesting that necessary and proper




Congress than to the courts to create remedies against the President
would not be an unreasonable one. For example, one might argue that
because the constitutional system places so many express checks on
presidential power directly in the legislative branch," that branch also
ought to have special authority (if anyone has it) to create new ones.
After all, legislating is by definition an innovative activity, and any con-
gressional statute dealing with the executive branch is likely to circum-
scribe presidential authority in some manner.3 5 If the Congress can
limit the President's authority, why can't it legislate to punish him
directly?
The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of
197438 may be seen as an example of punitive legislation. Every other
President has been permitted to collect his papers and dispose of them
as he pleased upon leaving the White House. The Act denied that priv-
ilege to Richard Nixon. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices,37 the Court upheld the Act against, among other things, a separa-
tion of powers challenge. The Court conceded that the President had
strong claims of confidentiality, but, it explained, in the narrow circum-
stances surrounding the Nixon resignation, Congress had the power to
revoke the President's traditional "privilege" of retaining his papers
and effects.38 The Act was a creative remedy for presidential miscon-
duct and was upheld even though the Act may have resulted more from
congressional pique than from concern for the accuracy of his historical
record. The point is that the Court permitted the Congress (whatever
its motivation) to act innovatively to impose a punishment that the
Court itself could not have imposed." By analogy, Congress might, in
the proper circumstances, have the constitutional authority to create
civil damages remedies against the President, even if the federal courts
34 Several of these checks are discussed in more detail infra, notes 185-203 and
accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (sus-
taining congressional authority to limit President's removal power).
36 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976).
S 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
38 Id. at 441-46. The Court did not address other constitutional arguments against
the Act's application to specific documents. See id. at 436-39. One commentator has
suggested that Nixon retains certain first and fourth amendment rights. See Note, Gov-
ernment Control of Richard Nixon's Presidential Material, 87 YALE L.J. 1601 (1978).
39 In a proper case, a court can order one who has custody of evidence to preserve
it, but the Act went well beyond the need to preserve presidential materials for any
particular litigation. The distinction drawn in the text should not be carried too far. To
say that a court cannot create the same remedies as Congress can is not to say that the
court has less power to create the remedies that it has traditionally created. See infra
text accompanying notes 131-56.
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lack power to do so.40 If the Constitution gives Congress greater power
than it gives the judiciary to create remedies against the President, then
the majority's reservation of the congressional power issue does not pre-
vent the decision's being read as a constitutional one or necessitate its
being read as a common law one.
This is, of course, sheer speculation. Nevertheless, the mere possi-
bility that the Constitution authorizes broader powers for the Congress
than the courts means that the dissent may be correct in characterizing
the opinion as stating a constitutional rule. As the dissenters read the
majority opinion, the majority has said that something about the Con-
stitution-the majority leaves unclear precisely what-prohibits the
courts from creating a civil damages remedy against the President. Be-
cause a constitutional immunity is likely-though not certain-to bar
Congressional action as effectively as it does judicial action, a finding
that the courts cannot impose a particular penalty probably means that
the Congress cannot impose it either. 4' Although safe from judicially
and congressionally created remedies, the President would not be
"above the law." The only sanctions available in the event of his misbe-
havior, however, would be those explicitly set forth in or readily in-
ferred from the Constitution itself.
B. What the Court (Might Have) Meant
The majority denied the charge that its opinion placed the Presi-
dent above the law,' 2 and yet clearly knew that its decision would leave
40 Naturally, the mere fact that Congress's authority to legislate to control the
President is broad does not imply that the authority is unlimited. As with other con-
gressional powers, it must be exercised in a manner consistent with other provisions of
the Constitution and, in particular, must not be used in derogation of the principles of
separation of powers. For an important recent reminder of this rule, see Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 194-202.
41 Congress might be able to circumvent the presidential immunity decisions (even
if the Court meant to establish a constitutional rule) by extending the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2880 (1976), to encompass actions for damages caused
by presidential act or order. Cf. P. ScsiucK, supra note 29, at 113-18 (analogous pro-
posal for wrongs by lower-level officials). As long as the defendant in a suit under the
amended Act would be the United States and not the President and as long as any
judgments would be paid from general revenues and not passed on to the President,
then most of the constitutional objections to presidential liability would fall. If the Pres-
ident were asked to produce papers or appear personally in connection with such a suit,
considerations of separation of powers would likely permit him to refuse. I am grateful
to Martha Minow and Peter Schuck for bringing these points to my attention.
42 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 767 (White, J., dissenting) ("the Court
clothes the office of the President with sovereign immunity, placing it beyond the law"),
and id. at 758 n.41 (majority opinion) ("This contention is rhetorically chilling but
wholly unjustified.").
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little besides the sanctions explicitly authorized by the Constitution to
check the conduct of an evil President.43 The majority noted that im-
peachment and other "formal and informal checks" would remain
available.44 Unless reliance is placed on historical references that may
not bear the weight,45 the references to other constitutional sanctions
(along with the vague allusions, already mentioned, to the separation of
powers) are as close as the majority comes to tying its reasoning to the
Constitution itself. The result has an air of expressio unius: because the
Constitution creates particular checks on presidential authority, a court
may not create fresh ones.
The Court cannot really have meant to deny the validity of any
check not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. After all, U.S. v.
Nixon held that the courts can command the President to comply with
subpoenas despite the lack of explicit textual support for such a power.
Nevertheless, the Court's expressio unius approach may form the basis
of a theory explaining the result.46 The Presidency (the Court may
4s The term "evil President," like the term "immunity," is used advisedly. Al-
though the lines might be difficult to draw, nothing in the presidential immunity deci-
sion suggests that a President who, for example, injured someone through negligence
not related to his office would necessarily be immune from suit. Nixon v. Fitzgerald by
its terms immunizes the President only from suits relating to his official conduct and
abuses of his official authority. One possible brightline would distinguish between those
things that he is able to do only because he is President and those things that anyone
could do. The former would come within the scope of his immunity and the latter
would not. Obviously, a private citizen would not have the opportunity to fire a civil
servant. The President of the United States might or might not have the authority to do
so, but his office would provide the opportunity. There is no need to make too much of
this distinction, and some of the arguments in the text admittedly cut against it. This
distinction is, however, one approach to making the result in the presidential immunity
case more palatable to those who find it distasteful.
44 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 757.
4 The majority consigned its historical discussion to a single lengthy footnote. Id.
at 750-52 n.31. Justice White's dissent vigorously disputed the majority's reading of the
history, see id. at 771-79, which may be why the Court did not belabor it. The majority
could, however, have constructed a stronger historical argument than the one it actually
used. See infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
" Of course, a demand for theory may be naive or even a cheap shot in these days
of doubt as to whether the Supreme Court is institutionally capable of principled deci-
sionmaking. Scholarship from all points on the ideological compass has contributed to
the doubt. See, e.g., Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982)
(interest of decisionmaking elite, rather than positive theory, determines outcome); Eas-
terbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REy. 802 (1982) (Arrow's theo-
rem demonstrates that no structure can ensure consistent outcomes if Court complies
with other norms of judicial decisionmaking); Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57
TEx. L. REv. 1361 (1979) (judicial activism leads inexorably to doctrinal inconsis-
tency); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980) (contradictions in liberal democratic
theory make consistent constitutional theory impossible). The conclusions drawn in
these articles may be right or wrong; for the purposes of the analysis in this Article, I
will pretend that theory is both desirable and important.
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have reasoned) is a political office, and under the constitutional scheme,
punishing the President is the responsibility of the overtly political ac-
tors-the Congress and the voters. Because of the awesome responsibil-
ities of his office, the President must often worry about the conse-
quences his actions will have for the country but he should
not-needlessly-bear the additional burden of fearing for personal
consequences to himself. The argument that the President's office and
duties are of such a nature as to render him unique in any constitu-
tional analysis has been made too often to bear repeating here.47 Suffice
it to say that the majority opinion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald has some of
the flavor of this argument.
48
Thus (so the majority's analysis could run), the judgment that the
President has gone too far, so far that he must be threatened with per-
sonal liability even at the cost of distracting him from his official duties,
is a difficult judgment and an essentially political one. The question
ought to be resolved by the political actors, and that is where the Con-
stitution has wisely placed the express power to check presidential
abuses of authority. If this line of reasoning is what actually underlies
the presidential immunity case, then the decision begins to make a fair
amount of sense and even acquires a certain logical appeal. The line of
reasoning resembles that underlying one strand of the "political ques-
tion" doctrine: the text and structure of the Constitution commit the
decision elsewhere, so the federal courts must keep their hands off.
4 9
That restraint, because it reinforces judicial legitimacy, remains one of
the most powerful arrows in the judicial quiver.
If the preceding two paragraphs fairly state what the majority
47 See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 83 YALE
L.J. 451, 467-70 (1979); Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United
States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 116, 130-40 (1974). The most frequent argument
for presidential uniqueness is the President's status under the constitutional structure.
As Professor Corwin put it: "The Constitution knows only one 'executive power,' that
of the President, whose duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' thus
becomes the equivalent of the duty to and power to execute them himself according to
his own construction of them." E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 84
(4th ed. 1957) (emphasis deleted); see also infra note 112 and text accompanying notes
127-30.
48 See 457 U.S. at 757. ("The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the
press," to "[v]igilant oversight by Congress," to "a desire to earn re-election, the need
to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a ...traditional
concern for . . . historical stature.").
'9 See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405
U.S. 15 (1972). A plurality of the Court has taken the position that at least some
disputes between the President and Congress should be viewed this way. Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment, joined




meant, then far from collapsing into a narrow statement of federal com-
mon law, the opinion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald says something tremen-
dously important: the federal courts lack the power to punish the Presi-
dent at all. For if the courts cannot compel him to pay damages to a
private individual, it is difficult to see how they could force him to pay
damages-in the form of a fine-directly to the court.50 And if the
courts cannot force him to part with his money, they surely could not
order him to jail. Yet those two weapons-deprivation of money and
deprivation of liberty-are the only ones that a court can use to force
compliance with its mandates. Absent those powers, a court may well
issue an injunction or a subpoena, but the court's order may, as Judge
Wilkey put it, turn out to be nothing more than a piece of paper bear-
ing the title.51 That the court's decision may be ignored does not mean
that no process against the President should ever issue; as will become
clear, decision and enforcement are logically separable. The possibility
that the President might simply disregard the judicial will does mean
that if the presidential immunity decision makes a statement about con-
stitutional law, that statement may really be that the federal courts can-
not force the President of the United States to do anything at all.
C. What the Court (Should Have) Said
The conclusion that the federal courts lack authority to punish the
50 One might argue that in the case of a fine for contempt, the Justices are pro-
tecting their own sphere-the judiciary-rather than "merely" defending individual
rights. If one looks through the other end of the telescope, however, one will note that
both cases involve the same issue: can the Court punish the President for doing wrong?
The fact that one wrong is done to an individual and the other to an institution (admit-
tedly a coequal one) does not change the juestion, and there is no immediately appar-
ent reason why it should change the answer.
5' In the original Watergate-related litigation over whether the President was the
proper subject of a subpoena duces tecum-litigation which did not reach the Supreme
Court-the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated
explicitly that the President's legal obligation to obey a court order did not rest on the
court's power to enforce it:
That the Impeachment Clause may qualify the court's power to sanction
non-compliance with judicial orders is immaterial. Whatever the qualifica-
tions, they were equally present in Youngstown. . . . The legality of judi-
cial orders should not be confused with the legal consequences of their
breach; for the courts in this country always assume that their orders will
be obeyed, especially when addressed to responsible government officials.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711-12 (1973) (en banc). The dissent scoffed at this
suggestion, arguing that a subpoena naming a party against whom it could not be
enforced was no more than "a piece of paper captioned 'subpoena.'" Id. at 792
(Wilkey, J., dissenting). The majority opinion adopted the approach advocated here,
treating decision and enforcement as logically distinct.
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President of the United States may at first seem somewhat startling,52
but after a little thought, it makes more sense. One may begin by hy-
pothesizing the contrary. Suppose a court did try to hold the President
of the United States in contempt for disobeying an order addressed to
him. Would federal marshals arrive at the White House, demanding
that the Secret Service agents let them seize the President? Suppose the
President-with the assistance of the security personnel-decided to re-
sist arrest. Aside from a definite air of lese majesty about the whole
thing, there is also the undeniable fact that should matters come to a
showdown, the President has more guns at his command than a federal
court does. The Supreme Court has never pretended otherwise. During
the Reconstruction Era, the Court in Mississippi v. Johnson53 took ex-
plicit note of the difficulties it would encounter in trying to "force" a
President to comply with an order,5" and dismissed a complaint against
President Andrew Johnson.55 Earlier opinions included dicta to similar
effect.56
The mere fact that forcing the President to pay damages might not
be easy does not by itself justify a constitutional rule against trying.57
After all, President Nixon did turn over the Watergate tapes, even
though the federal courts probably could not have enforced a contempt
citation against him.58 Besides, resistance to judicial decrees is hardly
52 The usual rule is quite the contrary: even claims of fundamental right are no
defense in a contempt proceeding for ignoring an injunction. See Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The thrust of the presidential immunity decision
(and of this Article as well) is that when it comes to court orders, the President is a
special case. I am grateful to Robert Cover for reminding me that the courts frown on
claims of a "right" to ignore their orders.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
See id. at 500-01: "[Ilt is needless to observe that the court is without power to
enforce its process."
11 Mississippi v. Johnson constituted an attempt to file a suit in the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to enjoin the President from carrying out certain of the
Reconstruction Acts. Consequently, Mississippi v. Johnson might be distinguishable
from a case like Nixon v. Fitzgerald because the former involved a suit against the
President for performance of a mere ministerial act. See Karst & Horowitz, Presiden-
tial Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 UCLA L. REv. 47, 50-51 (1974) (suggesting
this limited construction).
5 Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476-78 (1793) (dictum) (sover-
eign immunity derives from ability to resist judicial process).
51 If the mere possibility of presidential resistance sufficed to trigger presidential
immunity, it would not be easy to draw lines between the President and his subordi-
nates, many of whom could also-especially with presidential assistance-resist the or-
ders of a court. As will become clear, the President's power is important, but something
more is required before immunity is appropriate. There is a distinction, moreover, be-
tween judicial restraint and judicial cowardice, a distinction discussed in greater detail
infra, text accompanying notes 161-69.
" President Nixon's decision to yield the tapes need not be read as an acknowl-
edgement of judicial authority. He may simply have been bowing to political reality.
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new. 9 Had the President not decided to send troops to Little Rock in
the wake of Cooper v. Aaron, ° the schools in that city might be segre-
gated to this day."' The Court's inability to enforce its order without
the assistance of the executive branch did not mean that the Justices
had no power to issue the order. Thus the claim that the Court lacks
power to punish the President must be defended on some ground other
than the Court's lack of enforcement power.
In supporting its conclusion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the majority
focused on what it considered the public policy reasons militating in
favor of an immunity rule. Justice White's dissent at least showed that
these arguments have two sides.6 2 The malleability of public policy ar-
guments makes the majority's reasoning suspect, but need not vitiate
the result. In order to tie its decision more closely to the Constitution,
the Court could have relied on something other than public policy.
Before suggesting some justifications that, although available, were
absent from the majority opinion, it is useful to pause and recall what
the case did not involve.6" The Court was not required to construe the
Constitution's "open-ended" provisions protecting individual rights
against government abuse. The dilemma whether to read those clauses
as though the Constitution were a statute-or perhaps a contract-or
to take them as invitations to import extra-constitutional values moti-
vates much contemporary scholarship on constitutional theory."
See infra note 113.
5 Historic incidents of resistance are collected in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 140-50 (1980).
60 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
61 The text may be a bit unfair; times have changed. The unanswered question
remains one of chicken and egg-is integration more widely accepted because the courts
have been successful in ordering it, or have the courts succeeded in ordering it because
it is more widely accepted?
12 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 792-97 (White, J., dissenting) (attacking
the majority's "public policy" approach). See also Note, supra note 8, at 231 ("Far
from supporting Justice Powell's result, considerations of public policy point toward a
grant of qualified, not absolute, presidential immunity").
13 It is also useful to pause and recall that an argument that the presidential im-
munity decision could have been more powerfully reasoned is not the same as an argu-
ment that the case was rightly (or wrongly) decided. Constitutional theorists seek con-
stitutional theory, in "good" decisions as well as in "bad" ones. The search for a theory
to undergird the result in Nixon v. Fitzgerald is necessary, both to learn whether it can
be harmonized with past decisions and to try to discern what messages it might carry
for future ones.
" Although citations for this point would probably be a bit gratuitous, some of the
major currents in this muddy river might be discerned through a perusal of the widely
divergent views expressed in the following four recent works: R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
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Happily, determining whether a reasoned constitutional basis ex-
ists for the presidential immunity decision does not require wading into
the midst of that scholarly battle. Whatever the best approach to the
adjudication of claims under the clauses protecting individual rights
(and it is not at all clear that there need be only one), there is no
apparent reason to believe that the same interpretive approach ought to
apply to other constitutional provisions.6 5 Different sections of the doc-
ument have different purposes and interpreting each in light of its pur-
pose will probably lead to drastically different approaches. Thus, it is
one thing to look to extra-constitutional sources in deciding what rights
are "retained by the People"66 or incorporated in the phrase "Privileges
or Immunities; ' 67 it is something else altogether to do so when consid-
ering whether federal courts can, for example, review a presidential
decision to cast a veto-or whether the President is a proper defendant
in a suit seeking civil damages.
Provisions describing the functions and powers of the government
may demand a different interpretive approach from provisions describ-
ing the rights of the people. A strict textual approach, focusing on the
understanding of the Framers, may be a more sensible method to use in
interpreting the structural clauses of the Constitution.68 Whether it is a
more sensible method will be examined in the next few pages. If the
strict textual approach does make more sense, then the majority's pub-
lic policy analysis is probably inadequate to justify a constitutional rule
of immunity. It is therefore necessary to consider other possible justifi-
cations for the presidential immunity decision.
" Professor Ely has implied (although he probably didn't mean it) that constitu-
tional theorists should develop a single theory to explain adjudication under the entire
Constitution. See J. ELY, supra note 64, at 41 n.* ("the Constitution is not divided into
two sets of provisions, precise and open-ended"). In truth, some provisions of the Con-
stitution, such as the requirement that the President be thirty-five years of age, are
indeed more precise than others, such as the equal protection clause. Ely is apparently
prepared to concede this disparity. See id. at 13 ("Constitutional provisions exist on a
spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the extremely open-textured"). Al-
though Ely devotes much of his book to suggesting a single approach, it is not at all
clear why a single approach is needed to explain all of the document's provisions, pre-
cise, open-ended, and merely muddy.
" U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8 On the other hand, it may not. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Origi-
nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 237 n.124 (1980) ("Analytically and norma-
tively, I see no essential differences among the various areas of constitutional concern
that would automatically insulate any of them from the possibility of nonoriginalist
decisionmaking"); Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What
Price Purity?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 335, 337-38 (1981) (debate over best means of consti-
tutional interpretation includes "major provisions regarding the. . . allocation [of] gov-
ernment power" when they are "quite general in [their] scope and delphic or ambigu-
ous in [their] language").
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1. The Original Understanding Approach
As a general rule, scholars frown on attempts to construe the Con-
stitution by surveying the opinions of the eighteenth-century gentlemen
who wrote it and voted on its ratification. 9 The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, rarely permits a constitutional case to go by without dis-
cussing the "original understanding.17 0 The original understand-
ing-when one can be discerned-is more likely to be important in a
case involving the system of checks and balances than it is in a case
involving individual rights. The reason should be obvious. In protecting
individuals against government mistreatment, those who drafted the
1787 Constitution and its amendments took pains to use language so
broad as fairly to beg to be filled with substantive content from external
sources. They used words sparingly, an approach that makes sense
when one begins with a conception of rights as broad and government
power as narrow. 71 In structuring the government, however, the draft-
ers set themselves rather a different task and used dramatically differ-
ent language.
The 1787 Constitution set forth with painstaking attention to de-
tail the powers and functions of the federal government. Despite a few
glaring errors,72 the document reflects an obsessive concern for the mi-
nutiae of government operation. Words were used cautiously so as to
'9 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 98-110 (1962); J. ELY,
supra note 64, at 11-41; M. PERRY, supra note 64, at 20-24, 61-72; Brest, supra note
68; Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77
COLuM. L. REV. 1029 (1977).
70 But cf. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
119 (asserting that the Justices use history badly because they twist it in order to sup-
port the results that they desire). See also Professor Laycock's stinging evaluation of the
work of Raoul Berger (perhaps the most prolific contemporary advocate of paying close
attention to the original understanding), quoted infra note 79.
71 See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787 (1969); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in Amer-
ican Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978).
72 A good example concerns the role of the Vice President. The Vice President
serves as President of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. When the President of the
United States is tried in the Senate following impeachment by the House of Represent-
atives, the Chief Justice of the United States presides. Id. That is the only provision in
the Constitution requiring the Vice President to turn over the gavel to another individ-
ual. Yet the Vice President himself is also impeachable, and if impeached by the
House, he would be tried in the Senate. It appears, therefore, that the Vice President
could preside at his own impeachment trial, should he choose to do so.
7' This "obsession" with detail is only comparative. Few words in the document
are used in defining the rights of the people. Many are used in explaining the opera-
tion of government. The details set forth in the Constitution often give inadequate guid-
ance for the operation of the modern activist state, the rise of which the Framers could
not, of course, have anticipated. See note 199 infra. That their obsession did not pro-
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leave little room for interpretation. Thus although some wanted to
make the President impeachable for any reason, the delegates in Phila-
delphia finally voted to limit impeachable offenses to "Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,' 7 4 in the hope of limiting
congressional power over him.75 The Constitution also does not include
a requirement that members of the House of Representatives be "ma-
ture"-although maturity emerged as a major concern in the de-
bates 7 -but only that they be at least twenty-five years old.7 One can
duce perfect prescience does not mean that the obsession did not exist.
74 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
11 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 550 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter cited as RECORDS]. The Committee of Eleven had recommended limiting
impeachment to cases of treason or bribery. Mason responded that many abuses of
power would not fall within those narrow categories, and suggested the substitution of
"maladministration." But Madison, who drafted the phrase "high crimes and misde-
meanors," argued that Mason's proposal was "[s]o vague a term" that it would "be
equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate." Madison's phrasing was
adopted. Id. For a concise summary of the contemporary debate over which offenses
ought to be impeachable, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 430-31 (10th ed. 1980).
7" Madison's notes on the Convention recite the following:
Col. Mason moved to insert "twenty five years of age as a qualifica-
tion for the members of the 1st branch". He thought it absurd that a man
today should not be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself,
and tomorrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great na-
tion. It was the more extraordinary as every man carried with him in his
own experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of young politicians;
since he would if interrogated be obliged to declare that his political opin-
ions at the age of 21 were too crude and erroneous to merit an influence
on public measures. It had been said that Congs. had proved a good school
for our young men. It might be so for any thing he knew but if it were, he
chose that they should bear the expense of their own education.
1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 375. James Wilson challenged the assumption that the
young were immature: "Many instances might be mentioned of signal services rendered
in high stations to the public before the age of 25." Id. The motion to make twenty-five
the minimum age nevertheless carried by a vote of seven states to three, with one dele-
gation undecided.
A similar reduction of vague qualifications to a term of years appears in Tench
Coxe's pseudonymous discussions of the President and members of the Senate, pub-
lished in a Pennsylvania newspaper during the ratification debates under the byline
"An American Citizen." Of the President, Coxe wrote:
[H]e cannot be an idiot, probably not a knave or a tyrant, for those whom
nature makes so, discover it before the age of thirty-five, until which pe-
riod he cannot be elected. . . .Our President must be matured by the
experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirty-five
must be fully understood.
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 140-41
(M. Jensen ed. 1976) (emphasis deleted) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY]. Coxe noted of Senators: "No ambitious, undeserving or unexperienced youth
can acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous wealth or most power-
ful connections, till thirty years have ripened his abilities and fully discovered his merits
to his country ... " Id. at 143 (emphasis deleted).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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face, grants to Congress. The checks expressly authorized should be
adequate to rein in an abusive President.199 If it is dissatisfied with the
standard for benzene exposure promulgated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Congress need not resort to a legislative
veto to force a change. Congress could, for example, refuse to vote an
appropriation that the President desires or postpone the confirmation of
one of the President's nominees. Members of Congress should not hesi-
tate to hold one program hostage in order to force changes in an-
other. 00 If public pressure makes this strategy impossible, that simply
means that in a particular political struggle, the President has won.
That a system does not in the face of opposing public opinion lead
invariably to victory, hardly means that the system is evil or even weak.
Naturally, if Congress is going to use the full measure of its au-
thority to force concessions in one area in return, perhaps, for retreat-
ing itself in another, the leadership will have to pay careful attention to
the system of checks and balances. The decline of party discipline may
mean that the leadership will have difficulty in exercising control, 0 1
but with the demise of the legislative veto, enlightened self-interest may
move the Members into more consistent coalitions. No other course is
likely to lead to restoration of the balance of power, for the Supreme
Court's opinions in Chadha and Nixon v. Fitzgerald stand as obvious
calls to put politics back into the governing process.20 2 The system of
checks and balances is, after all, a political one, and its structure sug-
gests that the Framers cared more about making sure that no one
"" The term "abusive President" is used advisedly. Congress might be concerned
with two types of abuses: those involving wrongdoing in office, for which punishment
might be appropriate, and those involving the making of policy, for which pressure
rather than punishment would be appropriate. In designing the system of checks and
balances, the Framers were more concerned with the former than with the latter. They
were worried about creating a tyrant who would abuse his powers. They did not antici-
pate that the President would (through the growth of the executive agencies) also out-
strip the Congress in the race to make policy. For the Framers, Congress alone was the
lawmaking body, and it was the President merely who would react to the legislature's
initiatives. The alignment anticipated by the Framers has shifted nearly 180 degrees.
The reasons for the shift are probably complex, see supra note 183, but the solutions
must involve something other than attempts by Congress to find new ways to react to
policies proposed by someone else. The legislative veto was constitutionally doomed in
part because it tried to do precisely that. Instead, in keeping with the way the system of
government was designed to work, Congress should be searching for ways to regain
preeminence (or at least equality) in the proposal as well as in the disposal of policy
initiatives.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 189-92.
201 But see supra note 183.
202 One of the most unfortunate aspects of the reform-minded 1960's and 1970's
was the way that the word "politics" became more or less synonymous with "bad gov-
ernment." But the Constitution is a political document, not just a legal one, and not all
decisions on wise policy need be made by "experts."
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branch held total sway than they did about assuring the "best" decision
on every issue that might arise. In developing the structure of govern-
ment, the Framers sought to give each branch the powers necessary to
respond to patterns of abuse. 3
Thus, probably no one thought in 1787 that a President would be
impeached or defeated for reelection merely because he fired a single
civil servant unjustly or ordered a single illegal break-in.2 4 A President
might be impeached or defeated for either of those misdeeds, but the
issue would be entirely political, in the literal sense of that word: the
system would respond if public opinion considered the abuse suffi-
ciently heinous. On the other hand, should a President order a series of
illegal break-ins, sabotage political opponents, conspire to obstruct jus-
tice, and order secret military operations abroad, the Framers would
undoubtedly have felt that a pattern had been established, that here
was a tyrannical Chief Executive who had to go, whether by impeach-
ment or by resignation.20 5
The same would be true of an injunction or subpoena. Yes, a court
203 Both the words of the document and its history make clear that the Framers
contemplated impeachment of a President who committed a felony, but aside from felo-
nies, the evidence does not suggest that the President was to be punished for discrete
wrongs. This limitation should be plain from the structure of the government the Con-
stitution creates. The machinery available for presidential punishment-impeachment,
legislation, failure of reelection-is so unwieldy that it cannot easily be brought to bear
on a President whose acts are, in the view of the political actors in the system, relatively
minor. Some of the remarks made during the debates also suggest a concern for pat-
terns of abuse rather than for wrongs done to particular individuals. During the Phila-
delphia Convention, Madison argued that without the remedy of impeachment, the
Chief Executive "might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or op-
pression." 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 65-66. Randolph's fears that the President
would grow too powerful in time of war absent the impeachment remedy, are difficult
to understand in any other way. Id. at 67. And Franklin's half-joking reference to
assassination, id. at 65, was not likely aimed at a President whose "misconduct" com-
prised a single wrong done to one individual.
The historical evidence is hardly conclusive on the point, but when joined with the
structure of the system of checks and balances, the evidence does suggest rather strongly
that the Framers were not worried about such issues as whether a single civil servant
would lose his position unjustly. Perhaps the political and electoral checks on presiden-
tial misconduct are most effective when dealing with patterns of abuse but likely to fail
when confronting individual claims of hardship that must, in the larger scheme, be
considered de minimis. See infra note 209. Fortunately, the theory developed in text has
the happy byproduct of permitting remedies for many individual claims. See infra text
accompanying notes 208-19.
204 The articles of impeachment adopted by the House Judiciary Committee
shortly before President Nixon resigned did not include either of these charges. As the
text makes clear, however, the mere fact that Congress chooses not to impeach the
President for a particular abuse of authority does not mean that he will go unpunished.
Lesser sanctions are often available.
205 In fact, a strong argument can be made that the Nixon Administration ulti-
mately became precisely the "scheme of peculation or oppression" that Madison in-
sisted would render the Chief Executive impeachable. See supra note 203.
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may issue one, but if the President chooses not to obey, then it is up to
the political process to decide whether he ought to be punished for his
act of defiance. The political process includes the Congress, which will
act if a majority of its members choose to do so, and the public, which
may act if a majority of its members choose to do so.206 If the political
process does not force the President to obey a court order, then the
President will get away with disobeying it. The conclusion that the en-
forcement of judicial orders must be left to the political process is not
likely to please people trained as lawyers, because lawyers seek rules
and standards, and if enforcement of judicial orders is left to the politi-
cal process, then there really are none. 0 7 Lawyers, however, sometimes
forget that the Constitution is not merely a legal document; it is also a
political one. It describes more than a legal system; it describes a system
of government. Not all the decisions made in a system of government
are legal decisions. Many of these decisions are political ones, made not
by the lawyers in the system but by politicians and voters. Among the
decisions the Constitution vests in the political system is the decision
whether to punish the President of the United States.
C. But What About the Little Guy?
If punishing the President is up to the political system and if the
Framers were interested only in the big picture, then isn't civil damages
liability an appropriate (which is to say, necessary and proper) means
for granting relief to the little guy who has been wronged?
The answer is "no," although as will be seen, the "no" is a quali-
fied one. The system of checks and balances, the preservation of which
should be of preeminent concern, is a political system, and the struggle
for supremacy among the three branches is similarly a political one.
Supplying relief for the little guy-applying the maxim ubi jus, ibi
renedium-is not the purpose of the system.2 0 8 That is not because the
system is evil, but because trying to provide the best means for relief in
20 The voters in turn may be influenced by the enormous power of the modem
broadcast media, whose role in the function of the American political system has been
only inadequately explored.
207 For all that it may bother lawyers, the realization that the system of checks
and balances is essentially standardless would neither surprise nor disappoint a political
scientist. Cf LevinsonJudicial Review and the Problem of the Comprehensible Consti-
tution (Book Review), 59 TEx. L. REv. 395, 401 n.31 (1981) (suggesting distinctions
between views taken by lawyers and those taken by political scientists on same
institutions).
208 To say that relief for the wronged little guy is not the purpose of the system is
not to say it does not exist within the system. Fitzgerald himself, the plaintiff in the
presidential immunity case, was reinstated with backpay, in addition to being permitted
to pursue damages against presidential assistants.
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every case could, if it involves the creation of new remedies, raise the
same intractable problem discussed in the last few sections: The system
of checks and balances exists to eliminate the possibility of domination
by a single branch of government. The system was not designed to vin-
dicate each individual's every assertion of right. Any attempt to modify
the system to provide additional checks and balances carries the risk of
undermining the entire system. If one branch can "discover" or "im-
pose" a fresh remedy (especially for misconduct that must, in the
grander scheme, be considered de minimis)209 then that branch has a
fresh weapon in its continuing struggle with the other two branches. In
the absence of strict necessity, the constitutional scheme will not tolerate
the creation of these new remedies. "Necessity," moreover, must refer
to keeping the power in balance, and not to righting every wrong.
Improper presidential acts that do not provoke Congress into using
one of its big sticks-impeachment, say, or a rebellion on appropria-
tions-may yet be punished. If the President has political enemies care-
fully cataloguing his misconduct-and most Presidents do-then all his
acts that are even arguably wrong will be added to that list. If the list
grows long, the President's misdeeds may come back to haunt him as
his opponents recite them from the pulpits of the press and the broad-
cast media. Perhaps more important, the petitioners can be heard by
Congress if that body shows the spine and spunk to hear them. The
President would not necessarily be impeached and convicted as a result,
but even now, individual members of the Senate and the more powerful
members of the House are frequently able to take individual grievances
to the Administration. 10 Of course, the administration may turn a deaf
11, Certainly the wrongs charged in Nixon v. Fitzgerald were great and heinous,
but that is not the question. The question is whether, if necessity is a criterion for the
validity of new remedies, the necessity required should be based on the needs of a small
group of individuals or on the needs of the system. The thesis expounded in this essay
is that the only necessity justifying the creation of a fresh remedy is a fundamental
breakdown in the system of checks and balances, a reason to believe that the system is
not functioning as the constitutional structure requires. A failure to punish the Presi-
dent for a particular, discrete wrong does not amount to a breakdown of this sort.
Although one might argue that a failure to rectify a wrong done to even one citizen is a
breakdown that the system cannot tolerate (a proposition that is not easy to sustain, cf.
infra note 215), the argument cannot fairly be made in the case of a suit seeking dam-
ages for injury resulting from presidential misconduct. The President cannot act alone,
and someone will always be available as a proper defendant. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 216-17.
210 This description of the process of seeking a remedy may bring back memories
of old-style "boss" and "machine" politics, and the days when a citizen with a griev-
ance against the government went to see the local ward leader. The image may be
distasteful, but one should bear in mind that the idea of politicians acting out of
squeaky clean idealism is of relatively recent vintage. An important part of political
power, moreover, is the willingness to act to assist real individual people rather than
19831 1395
1396 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1341
ear, but if it does so too often, then a Congress that is fulfilling its role
in the system of checks and balances should slow legislation, appoint-
ments, or treaties the President has promoted, until the administration
becomes more cooperative. In this manner executive power can be con-
trolled even if Congress takes no formal measures.
Very well: in rare cases some sort of institutional response may be
forthcoming. But it will not be forthcoming in all cases, and perhaps
not in most. A wronged individual may bring his complaint to Congress
and yet receive no satisfaction. His Representative might ignore him,
the Judiciary Committee might make no report, the House might vote
not to impeach, the Senate, not to convict. None of that would mean,
however, that the system was not working. It is a little like something
Ann Landers once wrote of prayer: When someone prays but does not
get what he wants, it does not mean that the prayer has gone unan-
swered. It means only that the answer is "No."
The political system would be called upon to answer the question
whether the wrong done to a single individual by the President while
handling the myriad responsibilities of his office outweighs everything
else he might have done in a competent, even a brilliant, manner. The
answer often will not be easy. If Congress refuses to act, then it has
struck the balance against the petitioner and in favor of the status
quo.2" If the President's abuses grow, however, his partisans in Con-
acting on behalf of some amorphous concept of "the masses."
This argument does not mean that the Constitution was in some sense "designed"
to function in a system relying on political favors and debts. In their public rhetoric,
many of the Framers professed the ideological conviction that political parties are
anathema to the republican ideal. Arguably, the Constitution was drafted in part to
limit the influence of parties. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 1-
73 (1969). On the other hand, whether or not accepted in theory, political parties cer-
tainly existed and flourished before 1787. See generally J. MAIN, POLrICAL PARTIES
BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION (1973) (statistical analysis of voting patterns in state leg-
islatures). Many preconstitutional party leaders represented their states at the Philadel-
phia Convention. See id. at 409-53 (names of party leaders). These party leaders pre-
sumably did not go to Philadelphia to reduce their own influence.
As voters have become more sophisticated and party identification less important,
the power and importance of political parties have declined. See S. HUNTINGTON,
supra note 181, at 205-10. That decline does not mean, however, that the ability of a
single politician to seek relief for a constituent, or of a number of politicians to form
temporary coalition on behalf of many constituents, has changed.
211 Congress may fail to act for any number of reasons, including mere partisan-
ship. See Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1133-
34 (1974). Berger made this point as part of an argument that punishment of the
President should not be left to Congress, essentially because Congress cannot be trusted.
Whether Berger is right depends, of course, on what Congress is being "trusted" to do.
If the system is a political one-if it is standardless-then Berger's argument loses its
force. Congress is after all a political body and, under this Article's view of the system,
choosing whether to punish the President is a political act.
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gress might abandon him. Even a popular President may be toppled by
the mass defection of supporters. This danger will lurk in the shadowy
recesses of the President's mind, forcing him to glance over his shoulder
as he embarks on a course he knows to be wrongful. The further down
the road he goes, the larger the danger will loom. At some point, fear
should stop him. As Elbridge Gerry remarked during the drafting of
the Constitution, "A good magistrate will not fear [impeachments]. A
bad one ought to be kept in fear of them." '212 Of course the threat of
catastrophe may not stop the President. It apparently did not stop
Richard Nixon. But that is why the threat is capable of execution. If
the fear of impeachment is not sufficient, then its reality should bring
even the most abusive Presidency to a close.
The end of a Presidency may bring but little relief to the individ-
ual who believes himself wronged by the President, and seeks damages
from him. Yet under the rule established in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
President need not make the individual whole. Does this rule mean that
there are indeed some rights for whose violation the law affords no
remedy?213 This question must be rephrased before it can be answered.
Proponents of civil damages liability have consistently asserted that the
number of "serious" lawsuits the President would have to face is
small.21' This assertion necessarily implies, the litigiousness of our soci-
ety being what it is (ubi jus, ibi lawsuit), that the number of individu-
als with serious grievances would also be small. So the real question is
whether in a handful of cases, there will be violations of right for
which there will be no remedy.
212 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 66.
213 Blackstone's traditional formulation, echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) held that a "right" without a
"remedy" is not worthy of the same. As will shortly be seen, a proper understanding of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald does not require disputing these venerable precedents.
214 Professor Schuck's work in the field suggests that this assumption may be chal-
lenged on two grounds, accuracy and relevance. The challenge to the assumption's ac-
curacy accepts the contention that only a handful of lawsuits have been filed against
Presidents and former Presidents based on their conduct while in office, but notes that
had the Court reached the opposite result in Nixon v. Fitzgerald the decision might
have been read a broad invitation to those with grievances to come forward and sue.
After all, since the Court handed down its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the number of civil damages actions against federal officials has
increased dramatically. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 199-202. Whether these suits
are meritorious is irrelevant; the important point is that they exist.
The challenge to the assumption's relevance disputes the contention that because
an "objective" standard (what a reasonable person would have understood) is applied,
and because the Justice Department will provide defense for those sued in their official
capacity, frivolous actions will be dismissed on the pleadings at virtually no cost to the
defendant. Professor Schuck suggests that the cost to the defendant can prove quite
substantial, even if not in money. Id. at 114-62.
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A "yes" answer would not be difficult to defend, because the rules
of any forum may be sufficiently strict to stifle some claims for relief.
There is no reason to expect special treatment for victims of presiden-
tial wrongs. The right answer, however, is "no," for a reason that
should be plain. An individual wronged by presidential order is not
without a damages remedy; he will ultimately be made whole. He is
only without the defendant of his choice. The President does not act
alone. In this sense, he is analogous to the British monarch who, some
delegates pointed out during the ratification debates, cannot carry out
any act without the assistance of aides, who may be punished."' 5 If any
individual is harmed by presidential decree, he may sue all the func-
tionaries below the Chief Executive in the chain of command from or-
der to act.
The lesser functionaries may be held liable because the Supreme
Court has extended to them its common law implied cause of action.21 6
The best rationale for their liability, however, is not the need for
awarding damages to an injured party, but the need to provide ade-
quate checks on official malfeasance. The existence of civil damages
actions against presidential aides is a useful by-product of the decision
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, but the desirability of providing a remedy for
the wronged individual is not a sufficient justification for the holding.
Under the analysis presented in this essay, Harlow v. Fitzgerald was
correctly decided only if this additional check is necessary to maintain
the balance of powers.
The best argument for the necessity of this check is that although
the Constitution establishes a framework for punishment and control of
'15 This comparison to the British monarchy was used two ways. For James Ire-
dell, speaking in the North Carolina ratification convention, the distinction between the
Crown and the President was an argument in favor of ratification. The King was pre-
sumed to do no wrong, and his adviser would be punished in his stead. The President,
"[if] he commits any misdemeanor in office,. . . is impeachable, removable from office,
and incapacitated to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit. If he commits any crime,
he is punishable by the laws of his country, and in capital cases may be deprived of his
life." 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 109. ForGouverneur Morris, in the Philadelphia
Convention, this same distinction was (until he changed his mind) an argument against
the necessity for impeachment: "[The President] can do no criminal act without
Coadjutors who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be suffi-
cient proof of his innocence." 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 64.
216 The Court held that the so-called "objective standard" applies to these cases.
The application of this standard means that if the defendant can show that he acted as
a reasonable person would have under the circumstances, the plaintiff will probably
recover nothing. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. That result is a function of
the standard of liability and has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff can seek to be
made whole. A damages action for official misconduct is like any other damages action:
when the defendant has an adequate defense, the plaintiff, injured or not, will recover
nothing.
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an evil President, it does not do the same with respect to lower federal
officials.217 Thus, civil damages liability for the lower officials does not
constitute a fresh check in the same way that similar liability for the
President would constitute one. The constitutional system of separated
and balanced powers is designed to keep in check the President himself,
not his aides. That same system is adequate for preserving a congres-
sional role in the making of policy, which is why Chadha was rightly
decided. Legislative vetoes and civil damages liability of the President
would upset the delicately crafted system. With respect to the Presi-
dent's aides, however, there is no delicately crafted system to upset.
218
Thus, civil damages liability for lower executive-branch functionaries is
arguably necessary to preserve the balance of powers. Happily, the
remedy has the advantage of making whole those who have been dam-
aged by executive action.219
The issue, then, is not really whether a remedy exists, but only
whether the President is to be among those against whom the remedy
will run. Resolution of that issue has nothing to do with setting right a
wrong and everything to do with the balance of powers.220
2117 In particular (although this argument can be taken too far), the constitutional
structure provides evidence that the Framers did not anticipate the massive growth in
the power and responsibility of the executive branch. The Framers came to the Consti-
tution from the experience of the Articles of Confederation, which created no executive
branch. Although the desire to create a strong executive did much to motivate the call
for a new Constitution, see generally G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 393-429, it would be
counterhistorical to assume that the executive branch as it exists today is the one that
the Framers anticipated. This justification may not be the most effective one for the
result in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, but it is the type of argument that must be made if the
case is to be explained under the theory advanced in this essay. The alternative is the
one advocated by the Chief Justice in his dissent in Harlow v. Fitzgerald to wit, that
the case was wrongly decided. But it is far easier to show that presidential assistants
are unlike the functionaries sued in the cases he cites, see supra note 117, than to show
that they are like the President.
18 Those who consider the original understanding may find significance in the
apparent belief of some of the Framers that a civil damages action would lie against the
President's aides. See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 46-48 (A. Maclaine) (discuss-
ing suit against inferior officer who abuses authority); 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 64
(G. Morris) (President's aides "may be punished," at least for criminal acts).
219 When no assistants are available as defendants, the President must have acted
alone. The gist of Professor Freund's argument, quoted supra note 114, is that when
the President acts alone, he may be susceptible to judicial process.
220 Presidential immunity might also help to balance powers in a slightly different
sense, one suggested to me by Robert Cover. The tradition that a former President will
not be held to account for his conduct in office may underlie another tradition, one that
Americans take for granted. This is the tradition of smooth and nonviolent transfers of
power from one administration to the next. In many other societies, where former
heads of government are frequently tried and punished for their "abuses" of power, the
premiers spend large parts of their terms searching for ways to cling to authority-or to
protect themselves when they finally leave office. Their efforts may include compiling
information on political opponents to purchase a safer retirement; the arrest or assassi-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The journey has been a little long, but in the end, the outcome in
the presidential immunity case turns out not to be so startling.221 The
decision conforms to tradition and to intuition. Constitutional tradition
holds that the courts declare what the law is, and nothing in the case
prevents them from doing that. Intuition suggests that the President is
not above the law, and nothing in the decision places him there. That
leaves the question of who decides what should happen when the Presi-
dent chooses not to do what the courts decree. In a political system, that
is a political question. If Nixon v. Fitzgerald makes a statement about
constitutional law, the statement is probably that absent extraordinary
necessity, it is for the political actors in the system-members of Con-
gress and the voting public-to deal with presidential misconduct.
This theory reflects a view of the Constitution as a political as
well as a legal document and a view of the federal government as the
proper province not only of the courts but of the other branches as well.
It would be all too easy to leave every issue arising under the Constitu-
tion to judicial resolution, but Nixon v. Fitzgerald is a subtle reminder
that the courts cannot govern alone-and that the system's political ac-
tors should not want them to. In this sense, the presidential immunity
decision may be viewed as a kind of call to action. If there is a prevail-
ing view that the presidency is getting out of hand, then the time has
come for the government's potentially most powerful branch to reas-
sume supremacy. The power to make law includes the power to punish
and rests mainly with the legislature. The legislature does not do its job
unless it is willing to legislate, to reach decisions, to set policy. These
are the tasks that a Congress that governs ought to be performing.
Every day that it does less-that the voters do not force it to do
more-it is acquiescing in a shift of power to the executive branch.
Congressional weakness, because it threatens to upset the balance of
power, results in calls for extra-constitutional remedies. Those extra-
nation of likely successors; the perversion of governmental apparatus for rapid pecuni-
ary gain for a safer retirement; or even the suspension of democratic processes, making
an orderly succession impossible. Americans are fond of saying that it can't happen
here, but whenever something that might happen doesn't happen, there is a reason for
its nonoccurrence.
221 To say that the result is not startling is not to approve the reasoning process
through which the majority reached it. One may appreciate the essence of a thing with-
out liking all of its form. A reader may say of Nixon v. Fitzgerald much the same thing
that Mikhail Botvinnik, then chess champion of the world, said of a game he contested
with Bobby Fischer, then a teenaged prodigy. The game was complex and exciting and
hopelessly flawed, leading the world champion to comment later on: "'Too many mis-
takes?' the reader may justly ask. Yes, there were rather a lot!" B. FISCHER, MY
SIXTY MEMORABLE GAMES 253 (1969) (quoting Mikhail Botvinnik).
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constitutional remedies, however, might in turn destroy the balanced
system they are meant to preserve.
The message of Nixon v. Fitzgerald appears to be that the Su-
preme Court will not in the absence of extraordinary necessity act to
save Congress from its own weakness, to punish a President that the
legislature is unable to control. It is up to the political actors to save
themselves. If they do not, then the federal courts, sitting on the side-
lines, might finally be forced to enter the game. By the time they do,
however, it may be too late. If it is, then the other players will have
only themselves to blame.

